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Abstract
This article investigates the twofold impact that blockchain technologies and smart
contracts have on dispute resolution. On the one hand, these technologies enable private
parties to devise arbitral systems that are self-enforcing and, therefore, largely bypass the
recognition and enforcement procedures through which State courts traditionally exert a
certain control over arbitration. This phenomenon may in the future allow arbitration to
become entirely self-sufficient, thus leading to the marginalization of State courts. On the
other hand, however, such a marginalization has not taken place yet; to the contrary, the
recent blockchain-related phenomenon of initial coin offerings has given rise to some
prominent court cases. These cases raise particularly interesting jurisdictional questions,
especially in light of the difficulty of reconciling the decentralized nature of the block-
chain with the territorial approach whereby jurisdiction is typically allocated among
national courts.
I. Introduction
Despite the significant interest that blockchain technologies have sparked in legal
scholars, one particular aspect remains largely unexplored: the effects of distrib-
uted ledgers (and the devices associated with them, such as smart contracts) on
dispute resolution. This article fills the gap by providing an account of the dis-
tinctively twofold nature of these effects.
On the one hand, the unprecedented degree of contractual automation brought
about by these technologies fosters the emergence of private, self-enforcing sys-
tems of arbitration. These systems can potentially bypass the recognition and
enforcement procedures through which States traditionally exert a modicum of
control over arbitral rulings; inasmuch as self-enforcing adjudication based on
blockchain technologies spreads, hence, the role of national courts may be
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progressively marginalized. On the other hand, however, the blockchain-related
phenomenon of initial coin offerings (ICOs) has recently triggered the opposite
tendency; rather than rendering State courts obsolete, ICOs have generated a wave
of court litigation, arising in connection with prominent start-up ventures active
in this field. These ICO cases raise some interesting legal questions, especially as
far as jurisdiction is concerned. The delocalized and decentralized nature of the
technology, in particular, does not sit well with the eminently territorial approach
through which international jurisdiction is still allocated among different courts.
The article will analyse these problems and propose some tentative solutions, with
specific reference to the European Union (EU).
The remainder of this article proceeds in four sections. After this introduction,
Section II shows how the tendency of blockchain technologies towards the cre-
ation of private adjudication systems was already implicitly present in bitcoin
from the outset. Section III, then, outlines the current landscape of self-enforcing
arbitration based on these technologies, assessing its impact on the supervisory
role of courts vis-a`-vis arbitration. Subsequently, Section IV scrutinizes the rise of
ICO-related court litigation and the challenges it poses to the traditional criteria
for the allocation of jurisdiction. Finally, Section V draws some consequences.
II. Blockchain technologies’ inherent tendency towards
judicialization
The idea of the blockchain first emerged at the end of 2008, with the white paper
published by anonymous authors under the pseudonym of ‘Satoshi Nakamoto’.1
Throughout the last decade, the blockchain ethos has often been summarized by
reference to the notion of ‘decentralisation’;2 the white paper outlined the tech-
nical solutions enabling the development and maintenance of a mechanism
aimed ‘to make payments over a communications channel without a trusted
party’,3 where the classical functions of money (medium of exchange, store of
value, unit of account)4 would be carried out on a peer-to-peer basis, without
relying on any central authority and, most importantly, outside of the shadow of
State authority. In light of the obvious Hayekian overtones of the project,5 and
considering the vertiginous value fluctuations of bitcoin, the amount of academic
1 Satoshi Nakamoto, ‘Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System’ (2008)<https://bitcoin.org/
bitcoin.pdf> (accessed 3 May 2019). For a sociological background see Nathaniel Popper, Digital
Gold: Bitcoin and the Inside Story of the Misfits and Millionaires Trying to Reinvent Money (Harper,
New York 2015).
2 Primavera de Filippi and Aaron Wright, Blockchain and the Law: The Rule of Code (HUP,
Cambridge 2018) 34–35.
3 Nakamoto (n 1) 1.
4 For a critical account of Bitcoin’s ability to perform these functions see Stefan Eich, ‘Old Utopias,
New Tax Havens: The Politics of Bitcoin in Historical Perspective’ in Philipp Hacker, Georgios
Dimitropoulos, Stefan Eich, and Ioannis Lianos (eds), Regulating Blockchain: Political and Legal
Challenges (OUP, Oxford 2019) forthcoming.
5 Beat Weber, ‘Bitcoin and the legitimacy crisis of money’ (2016) 40(1) Cambridge Journal of
Economics 17.
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attention that bitcoin received from economists and social scientists in the years
following the publication of the white paper is not surprising.6 There is, however,
one aspect of the bitcoin white paper (and its subsequent percolation into count-
less blockchain-related ventures) that has not received extensive attention so far:
bitcoin’s inherent tendency towards judicialization—that is, the development of
its own dispute resolution architecture. This particular notion will provide the
backdrop against which the relationship between blockchain technologies and
dispute resolution will be scrutinized in this article.
The world envisaged in the white paper (which never materialized beyond the
province of libertarian dystopias) is populated by individuals interacting with
each other on a peer-to-peer basis, without the supervision of central authorities.
In Nakamoto’s vision, the technological self-sufficiency of the system would
render States, with their laws and their judicial apparatus, largely obsolete.
Given these premises, a question arises: in a system that does not recognize the
role of any central authority to supervise transactions and grant redress where
appropriate, how can individuals protect themselves? The question is all the more
relevant if one considers that cryptographically secure technologies such as
bitcoin, while not entirely anonymous, allow for a high level of pseudonimity;7
as a result, it is possible for two parties to engage in a transaction without having
any type of certainty regarding the identity of the counterpart, as the numerous
examples of online marketplaces on the so-called ‘darknet’ recently demon-
strated.8 How, then, can one trust a perfect stranger in such a bizarre lawless land?
The need for ‘trust’, which Nakamoto emphatically rejects as suboptimal at the
beginning of the paper, seems to immediately crawl back between the lines of the
white paper. The relevance of the question at hand is particularly evident in the
context of electronic commerce, which is the primary focus of bitcoin;9 for in-
stance, how can a buyer confidently transfer funds to the seller without any
guarantee as to what the real identity of the seller may be and in the absence of
6 See e.g., without any pretense at exhaustiveness, Reuben Grinberg, ‘Bitcoin: An Innovative
Alternative Digital Currency’ (2012) 4(1) Hastings Sci & Tech LJ 159; Dorit Ron and Adi
Shamir, ‘Quantitative Analysis of the Full Bitcoin Transaction Graph’ in Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
(ed) Financial Cryptography and Data Security: 17th International Conference, FC 2013, Okinawa,
Japan, April 1–5, 2013, Revised Selected Papers (Springer, Berlin 2013) 6; Nicholas A Plassaras,
‘Regulating Digital Currencies: Bringing Bitcoin within the Reach of IMF’ (2013) 14(1) Chi J Int’l L
377; Bill Maurer, Taylor C Nelms and Lana Swartz ‘“When perhaps the real problem is money
itself!”: the practical materiality of Bitcoin’(2013) 23 (2) Social Semiotics 261; Danton Bryans,
‘Bitcoin and Money Laundering: Mining for an Effective Solution’ (2014) 89(1) Ind LJ 441;
Andreas M Antonopoulos, Mastering Bitcoin: Unlocking Digital Cryptocurrencies (O’Reilly,
Sebastopol 2015); David Yermack, ‘Is Bitcoin a Real Currency? An Economic Appraisal’ in
David Lee Kuo Chuen, Handbook of Digital Currency: Bitcoin, Innovation, Financial
Instruments, and Big Data (Elsevier, London 2015) 31; Gerald P Dwyer, ‘The economics of
Bitcoin and similar private digital currencies’ (2015) 17 Journal of Financial Stability 81.
7 Arvind Narayanan, Joseph Bonneau, Edward Felten, Andrew Miller and Steven Goldfeder, Bitcoin
and Cryptocurrency Technologies: A Comprehensive Introduction (Princeton University Press,
Princeton 2016) 32–33.
8 Sesha Kethineni, Ying Cao and Cassandra Dodge, ‘Use of Bitcoin in Darknet Markets: Examining
Facilitative Factors on Bitcoin-Related Crimes’ (2018) 43(2) American Journal of Criminal Justice
141.
9 Nakamoto (n 1) 1.
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any central authority empowered to revert the effects of the transfer in case of
fraud or, more generally, in case of a failure to perform?10 The white paper an-
swers this question with a single, cryptic sentence: ‘[R]outine escrow mechanisms
could easily be implemented to protect buyers.’11 This apparently incidental
statement contains the key to understanding blockchain technologies’ inherent
tendency towards self-sufficient dispute resolution.
The white paper’s reference to ‘routine escrow mechanisms’ essentially means
that a buyer can, rather than paying the sale price directly to the seller, keep it in
escrow with a third party. If no disputes arise out of the sale agreement, the funds
held in escrow will be unblocked in favour of the seller. If, by contrast, a dispute
does arise, the escrow service provider will have the ultimate say as to where the
money should be directed: either to the seller or back to the buyer. Needless to say,
both seller and buyer must trust that the escrow service provider will not steal the
coins or collude with one of the two parties.
In a nutshell, the escrow mechanism envisaged by Nakamoto is precisely the
type of ‘trusted third party’ that the white paper purports to render obsolete.
Behind the smokescreens of ‘code as law’,12 what the bitcoin system actually aims
to develop is a realm of transnational social interaction that inherently tends
towards judicialization. In the absence of State courts, individuals are invited—
and in practice required, when they have no extrinsic guarantee as to each other’s
trustworthiness—to devise their own adjudication mechanisms, selecting the pri-
vate adjudicators (in casu, escrow service providers) of their preference.
From this point of view, bitcoin is far from revolutionary; it is actually a return
to a rather ancient, pre-Westphalian past,13 where jurisdiction was not an
10 When e-commerce payments are made through credit cards, such a layer of protection is offered
by the chargeback systems that credit card service providers typically offer: Fumiko Hayashi, Zach
Markiewicz and Richard J Sullivan, ‘Chargebacks: Another Payment Card Acceptance Cost for
Merchants’ (2016) Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Working Paper No. 16-01. In addition to
that, whenever the transaction takes place on a centrally managed platform (such as Amazon or
eBay), the platform normally provides a dispute resolution mechanism of its own: Ethan Katsh
and Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Digital Justice: Technology and The Internet of Disputes (OUP, Oxford
2017) 57-80. For a discussion of the the ‘regulatory’ role of platforms see Christoph Busch,
‘European Model Rules for Online Intermediary Platorms’ in Uwe Blaurock, Martin
Schmidt-Kessel and Katharina Erler (eds), Plattformen: Gescha¨ftsmodell und Vertra¨ge (Nomos,
Baden-Baden 2018) 37.
11 Nakamoto (n NOTEREF _Ref1375744 \h 1) 1.
12 The oft-misunderstood expression ‘code as law’ finds its origins in Lawrence Lessig, Code and
Other Laws of Cyberspace, Version 2.0 (2nd edn, Basic Books, New York 2006) 1–8.
13 Parallels between international commercial arbitration and the medieval practice of dispute reso-
lution among merchants have been drawn by Berthold Goldman, ‘Frontie`res du droit et lex
mercatoria’ (1964) Archives de philosophie du droit 177; Clive M Schmitthoff, ‘The Unification
of the Law of International Trade’ (1968) Journal of Business Law 105. See also, for an
extra-European historical account, Jan Paulsson, The Idea of Arbitration (OUP, Oxford 2013)
10-13. This narrative of arbitration is often closely connected to normative arguments favouring
the ‘decentralized’ nature of private adjudication: see e.g. Emmanuel Gaillard, Legal Theory of
International Arbitration (Nijhoff, Leiden 2010) 15–66; Emmanuel Gaillard, ‘Transcending
National Legal Orders for International Arbitration’ in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed),
International Arbitration: The Coming of a New Age? (ICCA Congress Series No 17, Kluwer,
Deventer 2013) 371; Julian Lew, ‘Achieving the Dream: Autonomous Arbitration’ (2006) 22(2)
Arbitration International 179. Michaels, however, casts doubts as to the possibility to draw a direct
parallel between the medieval history of commercial law and the current emergence of
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emanation of State sovereignty but, rather, a private service, provided by profes-
sionals and largely based on the consent of the disputing parties.14 It is for this
reason that systems such as bitcoin spontaneously tend towards judicialization; by
rejecting the authority of the State and its courts, they automatically trigger the
need for the parties to set up their own ‘courts’. Inasmuch as distributed ledger
technologies permeate different aspects of society, they generate as a by-product a
multitude of arbitral fora, enforcing contractual obligations on the request of the
private parties themselves. While Nakamoto’s vision never fully came into being,
many of the current developments concerning blockchain technologies seem to
corroborate this conclusion. For this reason, the next section will consider the
currently existing ecosystem of blockchain technologies from the particular point
of view of transnational arbitration.
III. The ecosystem of blockchain arbitral systems: a
terra incognita of transnational arbitration
In order to explore the terra incognita of transnational arbitration based on
blockchain technologies, it is first of all necessary to look at the current reality
of the phenomenon within the bitcoin system (subsection 1). Subsequently, it will
be possible to enlarge the perspective and look at parallel developments in other
blockchain-based applications (subsection 2).
1. Self-enforcing bitcoin arbitration based on multi-signature
addresses and its consequences on recognition and enforcement
Within the bitcoin system, users have devised a private adjudication system that is
slightly more sophisticated than the escrow mechanism initially envisaged by
Nakamoto: the multi-signature address.15 This device essentially works like a
lock with two keyholes; it can only be opened if two keys are used. Two parties
entering into a transaction can use this device to store coins (for example, the
price for the sale of certain goods), until the obligations arising out of that trans-
action have been performed. Both parties are provided with a digital key to the
address; if no dispute arises, they can use the two keys to unlock the coins, jointly
determining their final destination (typically, the address of the seller). In case of a
dispute, however, neither party can access the coins autonomously, but either of
them can ask a private adjudicator to review the facts of the case and determine
which of the two disputants is entitled to the disputed funds.
transnational systems of arbitration: Ralf Michaels, ‘Dreaming law without a state: scholarship on
autonomous international arbitration as utopian literature’ (2013) 1(1) London Review of
International Law 35.
14 Salvatore Satta, Contributo alla dottrina dell’arbitrato (Vita e Pensiero, Milan 1931) 50; for a
detailed historical account see Nicola Picardi, La giurisdizione all’alba del terzo millennio
(Giuffre`, Milan 2007).
15 ‘Address’ is, in Bitcoin jargon, the equivalent of a bank account, where funds can be stored.
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What the adjudicator is asked to conduct, in sum, is a rudimentary form of
arbitration, assessing the facts of the case and determining which party should
prevail. The private adjudicator is provided with a third key; unlike an escrow
service provider, hence, he or she has no unilateral access to the disputed coins
(which can only be collected if two keys are jointly used). The adjudicator, how-
ever, can provide his or her key to the prevailing party, thus ensuring that the
disputant entitled to the funds (who will now have two of the three keys) will
actually receive them. A multi-signature address, then, allows private parties to set
up a dispute resolution procedure that (despite its obviously primitive character
in many respects) is effectively able to enforce its own outcomes.16
While the use of bitcoin multi-signature addresses is by no means a mainstream
trend in transnational commerce, the scale of the phenomenon does come across
as surprising. At the time of writing, over 30 per cent of the existing coins are
stored on addresses of this type,17 and specialized websites even offer arbitrator-
rating services that the parties can use to find a private adjudicator for their
dispute, if need be.18 It is puzzling that the phenomenon at hand has been largely
ignored by arbitration specialists and transnational lawyers so far; adjudication
based on multi-signature addresses seems to be a unique form of transnational
arbitration, operating outside of the shadow of State law with a high degree of
finality and self-sufficiency. It could be argued that, from a purely technical
standpoint, this form of blockchain-based adjudication is the most advanced
practical instantiation of the theory of ‘delocalized arbitration’ put forth by prom-
inent scholars.19 Yet, to date, very little is known about the practical reality of this
procedure; the identity of the arbitrators (who are often non-lawyers),20 the
modes in which the parties and the arbitrators interact, the evidence-taking
mechanisms, and the substantive rules or principles applied to the disputes still
remain a sort of terra incognita of private adjudication, where most arbitration
scholars have not ventured yet.21
In order to fully grasp the impact of this set of technologies on private adjudi-
cation, it is particularly useful to look at their effects on the notions of recognition
and enforcement. Traditionally, an arbitral award can only produce legal effects in
a given national legal system once it has been recognized, and the law governing
recognition (most notably, in the context of international arbitration, Article V of
16 For a more detailed account of this technology see Pietro Ortolani, ‘Self-Enforcing Online Dispute
Resolution: Lessons from Bitcoin’ (2016) 36(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 595.
17 Addresses used to devise inter alia a multi-signature transaction are called ‘pay-to-script hash’: for
statistical data see <https://p2sh.info> (accessed 3 May 2019).
18 <https://www.bitrated.com> (accessed 3 May 2019).
19 See supra (n 13).
20 See the arbitrator ratings on the Bitrated platform (n 18).
21 The lack of academic visibility of these forms of arbitration is also discussed in Pietro Ortolani,
‘The Three Challenges of Stateless Justice’ (2016) 7(3) Journal of International Dispute Settlement
596.
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the 1958 New York Convention)22 allows the courts of the requested State to
decline recognition in the presence of a limited, but meaningful, set of circum-
stances, such as a violation of the right to be heard or irreconcilability with that
particular jurisdiction’s public policy. In other words, States maintain a certain
‘gatekeeping’ function vis-a`-vis decisions rendered by arbitral tribunals; recogni-
tion constitutes a minimal, but important, filter for arbitral awards, preventing a
ruling issued by arbitrators from producing any kind of practical effect in cases
that are widely regarded as ‘pathological’. By contrast, in the case of an arbitration
based on a multi-signature address, this filter is entirely bypassed; although the
ruling issued by the private adjudicator may well be denied recognition by State
courts, and the procedure may not even be regarded as a form of arbitration at
all,23 the private decision produces practical effects (namely, the coins are directed
to the prevailing party) without the need for any kind of intermediation on the
part of the State and its courts. It is, effectively, a form of self-enforcing arbitra-
tion, where the issuance of an arbitral decision and its practical implementation
not only are closely connected but also factually overlap entirely.
Further important effects can be observed with respect to the enforcement
phase, which traditionally follows recognition when the award debtor fails to
perform one or more of the obligations imposed in the arbitral award.
Enforcement is regarded, by its very nature, as an expression of the State’s mon-
opoly over the use of force; whenever coercion is necessary, such a result can only
be achieved by relying on public authority. Importantly, while the law applicable
to these matters varies significantly across different jurisdictions,24 enforcement
normally requires the creditor to follow articulate procedures, which strike a
certain balance between the need to enforce the creditor’s right (favor creditoris)
and the protection of certain interests of the debtor, which cannot be entirely
disregarded (favor debitoris).25 In other words, one could informally say that there
are good reasons why enforcement does not usually happen overnight; by way of
example, the national rules governing the time frames for asset forfeiture,26 or
22 Notably, however, the mechanisms set forth in the New York Convention are extended to do-
mestic awards as well by Articles 35 and 36 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration.
23 From this point of view a parallel can be drawn with ICANN arbitration, which allows for a
high-degree of self-enforcement while not being regarded as a form of arbitration which precludes
de novo court litigation: Thomas Schultz, ‘Private Legal Systems: What Cyberspace Might Teach
Legal Theorists’ (2007) 10 Yale Journal of Law and Technology 151.
24 Interestingly, this is true not only for arbitration, but also for the intra-European Union (EU) enforce-
ment of court judgments, despite the close cooperation in judicial matters that EU Member States are
required to engage in. As far as arbitration is concerned, Article III of the New York Convention
specifies that arbitral awards must be enforced ‘in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory
where the award is relied upon’. For court judgments circulating among EU Member States, Article 41
of Regulation 1215/2012 (Brussels I bis Regulation) states that ‘the procedure for the enforcement of
judgments given in another Member State shall be governed by the law of the Member State addressed’.
Enforcement, hence, seems to be immune from most attempts of harmonization, probably in light of its
inextricable link with the State’s sovereignty over its own territory.
25 Carlos Rogel Vide, Favor debitoris: Ana´lisis crı´tico (Temis, Madrid 2010).
26 For a comparative overview see Carel van Lynden, Enforcement of Judgments, Awards and Deeds in
Commercial Matters (Thomson Reuters, Toronto 2013).
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those setting certain limits to the possibility of attachment of earnings,27 serve the
important purpose of ensuring that the enforcement requested by the creditor
will not result in undue violations of certain fundamental rights of the debtor.
Needless to say, not all national legal systems strike the same balance between
the need for enforcement and the protection of the debtor’s rights, and an excess
of favor debitoris may be one of the reasons for the existence of significant obs-
tacles hindering the enforcement of arbitral awards and court judgments in some
jurisdictions.28 Nevertheless, despite these differences, most national laws seem to
acknowledge the need for some kind of balancing rather than enabling creditors
to obtain an immediate and entirely frictionless enforcement. Technologies such
as bitcoin, by contrast, do not adhere to the same logic; the allocation of the
disputed assets to the prevailing party happens instantaneously, by technological
means, without the intermediation of State courts and bailiffs and, most import-
antly, without any kind of evaluation as to whether certain rights of the debtor
should be protected. This shift from balancing to automation may not come
across as particularly worrisome for the time being, given that self-enforcing
arbitration based on multi-signature addresses is not a widespread practice
beyond the community of those who choose to trade in bitcoin. However,
things may change in the near future as contract automation and self-enforcing
dispute resolution extend to a multitude of other social systems. Hence, it is now
necessary to focus on these further developments.
2. Blockchain technologies, smart contracts, and other animals:
automating dispute resolution?
While bitcoin never developed into the mainstream payment system that its in-
ventor(s) had envisaged, it did have an important effect: the introduction of the
blockchain, the technology through which a ledger can be consistently main-
tained by users interacting on a peer-to-peer basis without the need for centra-
lized supervision.29 The blockchain has been recently promoted as a solution
applicable to a wide range of problems. While an assessment of the real usefulness
of distributed ledgers (as opposed to other types of technologies) falls clearly
outside of the scope of this article, it is undeniable that the last few years have
27 See e.g., in England and Wales, Section 6(5)(b) of the Attachment of Earnings Act 1971, requiring
that an attachment of earnings order specify the protected earnings rate, having regard to the
debtor’s resources and needs.
28 It is however interesting to note that the attitudes of different national lawmakers may progres-
sively converge, also as a result of the pressure exerted by comparative evaluations such as the
World Bank’s Doing Business Report or the EU Justice Scoreboard: Alexander Strelkov, ‘EU Justice
Scoreboard: a new policy tool for “deepening” European integration?’ (2019) Journal of
Contemporary European Studies, forthcoming; Adriani Dori, ‘The EU Justice Scoreboard:
Judicial Evaluation as a New Governance Tool’ (2015) MPI Luxembourg Working Paper Series 2.
29 In practice, the existence of a small number of powerful ‘miners’ has cast doubts as to the real
absence of supervisory authorities in the Bitcoin network: Ittay Eyal and Emin Gu¨n Sirer, ‘Majority
Is Not Enough: Bitcoin Mining Is Vulnerable’ in Nicolas Christin and Reihaneh Safavi-Naini
(eds), Financial Cryptography and Data Security (Springer, Berlin 2014) 436.
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been characterized by a significant enthusiasm30 for peer-to-peer record-keeping
solutions beyond the specific application of ‘digital cash’.31
One of the most prominent ventures based on blockchain technologies is un-
doubtedly Ethereum. Ethereum was launched in 2015 with the main purpose of
overcoming some of the limitations of bitcoin and, in particular, enabling users to
enter into transactions more complex than a simple transfer of funds. When two
Ethereum users enter into an agreement, they are able to translate (at least sig-
nificant parts of) that agreement into software script, thus relying on the tech-
nology (rather than on each other’s good faith and individual initiative) to ensure
the performance of the obligations arising out of it. This type of mechanism is
widely labeled as ‘smart contract’. Such a definition is partially misleading as the
legal qualification of this type of transaction as a contract is not absolute (but
obviously depends on the formal and substantive details of the transactions as well
as the applicable law),32 and the script simply provides a deterministic infrastruc-
ture rather than any form of artificial intelligence. Despite the terminological
pitfalls, however, it is important to assess to what extent this application of
blockchain technologies may have an impact on dispute resolution.
The idea of a self-executing agreement may apparently suggest that any need for
third party contract enforcement33—for example, through arbitration or court
litigation—is rendered obsolete.34 This, however, clearly cannot be the case as
long as software script only allows for the automation of those parts of an agree-
ment that are deterministic in nature. For any non-trivial transaction,35 a signifi-
cant portion of the parties’ agreement cannot be encoded in if-then statements
but, rather, is encompassed by non-deterministic notions and general clauses
such as good faith, reasonableness, and the many other concepts forming the
backbone of contract law. Unless artificial intelligence develops to the stage where
a machine can mimic human reasoning in this respect, the need for a third party
human adjudicator cannot be excluded, whenever a contractual dispute requires
the application of this type of legal concept.36
30 For an analysis of the negative consequences of such wave of enthusiasm on the part of retail
investors see infra, section IV.
31 Nakamoto (n 1).
32 Mateja Durovic and Andre´ Janssen, ‘The Formation of Blockchain-based Smart Contracts in the
Light of Contract Law’ (2018) 26(6) European Review of Private Law 753.
33 On the need for enforcement that normally arises out of contractual interaction see Alec Stone
Sweet, ‘Judicialization and the Construction of Governance’ (1999) Comparative Political Studies
147.
34 On this topic see the analysis carried out by Larry A DiMatteo and Cristina Poncibo´, ‘Quandary of
Smart Contracts and Remedies: The Role of Contract Law and Self-Help Remedies’ (2018) 26(6)
European Review of Private Law 805.
35 From this point of view, it is telling that the notion of ‘smart contract’ has been developed with
reference to vending machines: Nick Szabo, ‘Formalizing and Securing Relationships on Public
Networks’ (1997) 2(9) First Monday. While the purchase concluded through a vending machine
does constitute a contract, it is obvious that not all commercial transactions can be reduced to that
paradigm.
36 Eric Tjong Tjin Tai, ‘Force Majeure and Excuses in Smart Contracts’ (2018) 26(6) European Review
of Private Law 787.
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Despite the persistent need for third party adjudication, the tendency towards
contract automation (evinced by current trends such as the one of smart con-
tracts) does have an important consequence for dispute resolution. In platforms
like Ethereum, such a consequence is normally referred to with the notion of an
‘oracle’.37 Despite its magniloquent name, the idea is quite simple; an oracle is an
external source of information, which a script (for example, a smart contract) can
refer to and draw inferences from. Let us suppose, for instance, that the contract
whereby a traveler purchases an airplane ticket is encoded in a smart contract. If
programmed correctly, the smart contract may use the data concerning the time
of departure and arrival of the flight as an oracle to determine whether the flight
schedule was respected. If, on the basis of that information, it appears that a delay
occurred, the smart contract could be programmed to immediately transfer the
price (or a part thereof) back to the traveler as a compensation.38
The mechanism of oracles can be readily applied to arbitration; a smart contract
can defer to the decision of a third party adjudicator, such as an arbitral tribunal, and
determine the final recipient of certain disputed assets on the basis of a ruling made
by that oracle. In other words, the external information retrieved by the smart
contract could be an arbitral award, and software script could be used to enforce
the outcome of the procedure. Through this type of device, the potential for self-
enforcement already inherent in the ‘routine escrow mechanisms’ first theorized by
Nakamoto could extend to a much wider range of economic interactions, inasmuch
as different types of contracts are increasingly translated into code.39
The technologies at hand offer an unprecedented opportunity for arbitration to
evolve. As the possibility for parties to encode their contracts into script extends
beyond the rather narrow limits originally imposed by the bitcoin protocol, new
prospects for efficient arbitral procedures arise. It is perhaps not unrealistic to
imagine that, in the near future, the leading arbitral institutions will consider
adapting their current rules to the needs of ,,smart contract arbitration. In this
respect, it would be particularly desirable to develop normative criteria as to how
the operative part of an arbitral award should be drafted in order to facilitate its
use as an oracle, feeding information into the smart contract. Notably, even
assuming the absence of any initiative on the part of ‘traditional’ arbitral insti-
tution, many blockchain-related ventures such as EOSIO40 and Mattereum41 are
37 De Filippi and Wright (n 2) 75.
38 The example is drawn from an actual proposal to automate compensation for flight and railway
delays, in Germany: ‘Entschließung des Bundesrates ,,Fahrgastrechte sta¨rken:
Entscha¨digungsanspru¨che der Verbraucherinnen und Verbraucher bei Verspa¨tungen und
Ausfa¨llen im Flug- und Bahnverkehr automatisieren“’ <https://www.bundesrat.de/SharedDocs/
drucksachen/2018/0501-0600/571-18(B).pdf ?__blob=publicationFile&v=1> (accessed 3 May
2019).
39 To be sure, any such endeavour to translate the language of contracts into code is fraught with
obstacles, also in light of the differences existing across legal systems as to drafting styles: Michel
Cannarsa, ‘Intepretation of Contracts and Smart Contracts: Smart Interpretation or Interpretation
of Smart Contracts’ (2018) 26(6) European Review of Private Law 773.
40 <https://eoscorearbitration.io/> (accessed 3 May 2019).
41 <https://mattereum.com/> (accessed 3 May 2019).
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currently developing solutions to integrate arbitration within the architecture of
smart contracts.
While opening new possibilities, the growing self-enforceability of arbitral
awards also poses significant challenges. First and foremost, the marginalization
of recognition procedures (already present in the case of bitcoin adjudication
based on multi-signature addresses) risks becoming a large-scale issue.
Importantly, however, the existence of such a risk is not enough to immediately
conclude that a restrictive regulatory approach is necessary.42 In principle, even if
blockchain technologies did succeed at devising widely used systems of self-enfor-
cing arbitration, other techniques could be available to safeguard the values (such
as public policy) that State-controlled recognition procedures currently protect.
Let us, for instance, consider the hypothesis of an arbitral award granting damages
for the breach of an anti-competitive agreement. Traditionally, such an award
may be denied recognition and enforcement under Article V(2)(b) of the New
York Convention, inasmuch as the provisions of competition law violated by the
award have public policy status in the requested State.43 By contrast, assuming
that the anti-competitive agreement could be encoded in a smart contract pro-
viding for arbitration and using any resulting arbitral award as an oracle, it would
in principle be possible for the tribunal to force compliance with the award ‘on-
chain’, despite its incompatibility with competition law. States, however, may
have other possibilities of reaction—for example, ordering that the sums of
money automatically paid by the smart contract (on the basis of the information
provided by the anti-competitive award oracle) be paid back ‘off-chain’. In other
words, the fact that some contractual obligations may increasingly be enforced
through technological means does not entail that the State’s control over those
obligations must occur via those same means. The only serious obstacle, in this
respect, would arise in a hypothetical future where all relevant assets circulate on
technological platforms allowing for a high degree of automation, thus rendering
the prospect of an off-chain transaction reversal factually impracticable. Such a
scenario, however, seems to mainly belong to the realm of dystopian literature for
the time being.
A further challenge concerns the aforementioned need to strike a balance be-
tween creditor and debtor rights in the context of enforcement procedures. As
illustrated above, the logic of frictionless automated enforcement appears difficult
to reconcile with the balancing paradigm traditionally adopted by the national
laws governing enforcement.44 If self-enforcement were to spread beyond the
specific and rather isolated settings in which it currently exists, it would likely
42 In fact, the prevailing regulatory attitude at the moment aims at encouraging decentralization,
rather than limiting it: Philipp Hacker, Ioannis Lianos, Georgios Dimitropoulos and Stefan Eich,
‘Regulating Blockchain: Techno-Social and Legal Challenges – An Introduction’ in Hacker,
Dimitropoulos, Eich and Lianos (n 4) forthcoming.
43 See, with reference to EU law, case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v Benetton International
NV, ECLI:EU:C:1999:269.
44 See supra, section III.1.
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become necessary to regulate code, posing certain limits to the ways in which
private enforcement (inter alia, of arbitral awards) can take place. Let us consider
the hypothesis of a residential rental agreement, where a smart contract is capable
of controlling the door lock of the apartment, blocking it if the tenant fails to pay
the amounts that the parties have agreed upon.45 In such a scenario, automatic
enforcement may evidently result in the violation of the tenant’s fundamental
rights, and the circumvention of guarantees traditionally put in place by State
law.46 To limit this type of risk, the law of enforcement may progressively need to
become a law of software, providing bright-line criteria as to the limits within
which the code should be allowed to operate.
One of the most delicate questions that have arisen, having foreshadowed the
possible future need for regulation of self-enforcement, is what the most appropriate
regulatory venue may be. Considering that the procedures governing enforcement
are usually regarded as strictly linked to national sovereignty,47 it may at first sight
appear desirable to leave it to each State to take action in this respect. There are,
however, two reasons why the regulation of self-enforcement at the State level would
be suboptimal. First, regulating code requires a relatively new type of expertise,
which is not likely to be distributed evenly among national legislators. The likely
result, hence, would be that some legislators would take action, while other ones
would not be as ready or able to adapt their enforcement laws to this new techno-
logical reality. This, in turn, would result in a level of protection so uneven as to be
difficult to justify.48 Second, if the legislative framework applicable to self-enforce-
ment changed drastically depending on the law applicable to a given contract,
businesses offering their services internationally would be faced with significant
compliance costs; in the worst-case scenario, new scripts would have to be developed
for every jurisdiction where a given business operates.49
For these reasons, regulation at the transnational level seems to be particularly
desirable. In order to ensure effectiveness while avoiding excessive restraints on
technological evolution, a first meaningful step could be the development of soft
law guidelines, identifying a list of practices that coders should avoid.50
Additionally, a trust mark could be offered to the developers who voluntarily
45 Notably, the technology envisaged in this example is already offered by several companies offering
‘smart lock’ products: <https://slock.it/> (accessed 3 May 2019).
46 See e.g., in England and Wales, section 21(1)(b) of the Housing Act 1988, according to which a
tenant must be given at least two months’ notice before an order for possession of the house can be
issued by the court.
47 See supra, (n 18) and accompanying text.
48 As pointed out in section III.1. above, the lack of harmonization as to the national laws governing
enforcement is to a certain extent understandable and not problematic. Such a fragmentation
would however probably become excessive, if some national legal systems put in place guarantees
to prevent the use of self-enforcement devices that are likely to have a negative impact on funda-
mental rights, while other legislators took no action at all in this respect.
49 To complicate things further, some of these hypothetical automation-limiting laws may in some
instances have extraterritorial application, in light of the particular interests they aim at protecting.
50 This regulatory approach has already proved useful in the case of the 2004 IBA Guidelines on
Conflict of Interest in International Arbitration, which contain different lists describing practical
scenarios and attaching different types of consequences to them.
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agree to comply with the guidelines, certifying the respect of some basic guaran-
tees and principles. In sum, the degree of automation brought about by new
technologies should be no cause for immediate alarm, but it should encourage
transnational lawyers to observe the evolution of these phenomena closely and
propose commensurate reform, where appropriate.
IV. Blockchain technologies and court litigation:
decentralization and its discontents
The analysis carried out so far indicates that blockchain technologies will trigger
the emergence of self-sufficient private adjudication systems, where arbitral rul-
ings can be enforced without relying on the support of State courts. This in turn
suggests that, as technology-driven self-enforcement gains momentum, it may
become increasingly difficult for national courts to scrutinize the contents of
dispute resolution outcomes. This assessment, however, looks at the future
rather than at the current state of affairs. For the time being, blockchain technol-
ogies have not succeeded in marginalizing State courts yet, but have in fact trig-
gered the opposite phenomenon: a significant amount of court litigation,
especially in the USA, connected with the rise of ICOs. Over the past two years,
ICOs have disrupted the landscape of venture capital, financial markets, and
corporate finance law, but they have also given rise to some notable high-value
court cases. These cases pose some fascinating and yet-to-be-answered questions,
especially concerning jurisdiction. In order to understand this type of effect that
blockchain technologies have had on dispute resolution, it is first of all necessary
to briefly summarize what ICOs are.
1. ICOs: a primer
ICOs are a crowdfunding instrument, mainly meant for start-up ventures. While
it is impossible to account for a host of details, which may vary depending on the
project, most ICOs are based on the same structure: a company is seeking capital
to develop an idea, typically concerning distributed ledgers and other blockchain-
related technologies. Rather than relying on traditional channels (such as debt or
equity), the company advertises its project in a ‘white paper’, where the agenda for
future technological and commercial growth is described and a minimum
amount of funds necessary for the project is set. Investors (especially at the
retail level) are invited to fund the project by buying ‘tokens’. The procedure
whereby the investors pay for the tokens and receive them is normally regulated
by the ICO general terms and conditions (T&C). Once the ICO is concluded, the
capital should be used by the start-up to commence development as long as the
minimum threshold is met; by contrast, if the funds raised do not reach the
threshold, the investors should immediately receive their capital back.
Tokens are, in essence, digital assets registered on a blockchain. Token holders
benefit from tokens in two main ways. First, the tokens may grant access to certain
benefits once the start-up project comes to fruition; they may, for instance, be
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used as a platform-specific currency or as a voucher ensuring the enjoyment of
services or goods. Second, tokens are tradable on the secondary market; the
holders can resell them rather than waiting for the start-up to successfully com-
plete development.
The proportions of the ICO phenomenon are far from negligible; US $6 billion
were raised through ICOs in 2017,51 and Ether (the cryptocurrency most fre-
quently used to buy tokens) rose in price from US $9.70 on 1 January 2017 to US
$1,016.50 on 1 January 2018.52 Because of this sudden popularity, ICOs seemed
destined to fund a wave of important, innovation-driven ideas. Soon, however,
significant problems surfaced; many projects for which ICOs were deployed
turned out to be unviable, and national regulators (such as the Securities and
Exchange Commission in the USA) began to argue that the tokens may qualify as
securities (hence, implying the existence of serious violations of securities law).53
2. A wave of ICO-related litigation
Year 2017 was marked by the filing of class actions in the USA against companies
that had raised capital through ICOs. The causes of action in these cases, which
are currently pending, include securities fraud, false advertisement, unfair com-
petition, breach of contract, and breach of consumer law. In this respect, the
Tezos ICO is particularly interesting.54 In 2017, Tezos managed to raise US
$232 million through an ICO, and the subscribers received a specific type of
token called a ‘tezzie’. The Tezos project, however, faced some unexpected com-
plications, related, inter alia, to a dispute over the project’s governance.55 The
token holders then filed a number of lawsuits in US courts,56 and a US district
judge for the Northern District of California denied a motion to dismiss filed by
the defendants.57
The Tezos case is particularly notable, but it is not the only example of ICO-
related litigation.58 Given that tokens were purchased not only in the USA but also
51 CoinDesk, ICO Tracker <https://www.coindesk.com/ico-tracker> (accessed 3 May 2019).
52 BitStamp <https://www.bitstamp.net/> (accessed 3 May 2019).
53 Securities and Exchange Commission, ‘Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs)’ <https://www.sec.gov/
ICO> (accessed 3 May 2019.
54 For a background in the Tezos ICO and its aftermath see Gideon Lewis-Kraus, ‘Inside the Crypto
World’s Biggest Scandal’ (Wired, 19 July 2018).
55 Ibid.
56 In re Tezos Sec. Litig., No. 17-CV-06779-RS, 2018 WL 2387845 (N.D. Cal. May 25, 2018); see also
Baker v. Dynamic Ledger Sols., Inc., No. 17-CV-06850-RS, 2018 WL 656012 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 1,
2018); MacDonald v. Dynamic Ledger Sols., Inc., No. 17-CV-07095-RS, 2017 WL 6513439 (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 20, 2017); Okusko v. Dynamic Ledger Solutions, Inc. et al., Case No. 17-cv-6829; GGCC,
LLC v. Dynamic Ledger Sols., Inc., No. 17-CV-06779-RS, 2018 WL 1388488 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16,
2018).
57 Order on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss <https://www.scribd.com/document/385729594/
Tezos-doc#from_embed?campaign=SkimbitLtd&ad_group=100652X1574425X732a2411f047fa7
b8feed214cd9fcb49&keyword=660149026&source=hp_affiliate&medium=affiliate> (accessed 3
May 2019).
58 See e.g. Rensel v. Centra Tech Inc., et al., 17-cv-24500-JLK (S.D. Fla.); Hodges, et al. v. Monkey
Calital, LLC, et al., 17-81370 (S.D. Fla.); Balestra v. ATBCOIN, LLC, et al., 17-10001 (S.D.N.Y.);
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all over the world (both via the primary and the secondary market), it is reason-
able to assume that disputes of this type will surface in other jurisdictions too in
the near future. Out of the many unresolved problems that these cases unavoid-
ably raise, one of them has an important impact on dispute resolution; the
decentralized nature of the peer-to-peer network on which the tokens circulate,
coupled with the existence of a transnational secondary market where the tokens
can rapidly change hands, makes it particularly difficult for State courts to de-
termine whether they have jurisdiction or not. The next subsection will address
this problem, using Tezos as a case study and analysing these issues from the
specific perspective of EU law and, in particular, the Brussels I bis Regulation.59
3. Consequences of decentralization for court jurisdiction
In Tezos, the problem of jurisdiction was one of the first that the district judge had
to address.60 In general, whenever general jurisdiction does not attach to the
defendant, US courts can claim jurisdiction in the concurring presence of three
requirements:
(i) the defendant must purposefully direct his activities or conduct transac-
tions with the forum or a resident thereof;
(ii) the claim must arise out of these activities;
(iii) the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.61
Applying these criteria to ICOs, it could be possible for US courts to establish
personal jurisdiction in cases where the ICO was, for example, advertised on a
website hosted on a server located in the forum, which marketed the offering to
investors residing therein.
Assuming that similar questions would rise before the courts of an EU Member
State, the most intuitive way to establish jurisdiction would be reliance on Article
4(1) of the Brussels I bis Regulation; however, in cases where the defendant is not
domiciled in the forum, it would become necessary to rely on the special heads
enshrined in the instrument. If the investor is not a professional, a possible ap-
proach could consist in the invocation of the forum actoris provision set forth in
Articles 17 and 18 for the protection of consumers. From this point of view,
however, the reasoning of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
in Kolassa may prove to be a significant obstacle.62 In Kolassa, the Court held that
consumer jurisdiction can be established pursuant to the provisions at hand63
Stormsmedia, LLC v. Giva Watt, Inc., et al., 17-00438 (E.D.Wash.); Davy, et al. v. Paragon Coin,
Inc., et al., 18-00671 (N.D.Cal.).
59 See supra (n 23).
60 See supra (n 57).
61 Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004).
62 Harald Kolassa v Barclays Bank plc, case C-375/13, ECLI:EU:C:2015:37.
63 Articles 15 and 16 of the Brussels I Regulation, corresponding to Articles 17 and 18 of the Brussels I
bis Regulation.
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only if a direct contractual relationship exists between the issuer of the securities
and the non-professional subscriber. Therefore, if one were to apply the same
rationale to ICOs, claimants may only invoke the protective head of consumer
jurisdiction if they acquired the tokens (as non-professional investors) directly
from the issuer (that is, the start-up company or the different legal entity con-
ducting the ICO on its behalf). If, conversely, the tokens were purchased on the
secondary market, as it often happens, a non-professional investor could not use
Articles 17 and 18 to establish jurisdiction. For the same reasons, the establish-
ment of jurisdiction in contractual matters under Article 7(1) of the Brussels I bis
Regulation would likely be precluded, as the privity requirement (as entailed in
Kolassa) may not be met in the case of a secondary market purchase.
In this scenario, a claimant wishing to avoid the courts of the Member State
where the respondent is domiciled may have no choice but to try to establish
tortious jurisdiction under Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation.64 In this
respect, the decentralized nature of the blockchain poses some particularly inter-
esting challenges. Once again, Kolassa constitutes an important starting point; in
that case, the CJEU held (also on the basis of its previous case law)65 that, while
the mere fact of having suffered financial damage is not enough to establish
tortious jurisdiction at a given location, Member State courts have jurisdiction
when the ‘damage alleged occurred directly in the applicant’s bank account held
with a bank established within the area of jurisdiction of those courts’.66 Adapting
the same reasoning to the ICOs, it may potentially be argued that the courts of a
Member State have jurisdiction under Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation
if the private encryption key67 through which the claimant accessed her or his
wallet (for example, Ethereum) was stored on a device located in that Member
State.68 It must be noted, though, that the analogy is not perfectly fitting; by their
very nature, blockchains are decentralized, and a wallet storing tokens is therefore
not entirely comparable with a bank account. More specifically, in the case of
tokens, the physical location of the assets can be established only in an indirect
fashion, looking at the location of the private key, rather than at the tokens, which
only exist on a global distributed ledger with no specific geographical coordinates.
Furthermore, the CJEU itself distinguished Kolassa in the Universal Music judg-
ment,69 holding that for tortious jurisdiction to exist the location of a bank ac-
count is not sufficient in and of itself, but further factual circumstances must be
64 Corresponding to Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation.
65 Kolassa (n 62) para 48 with reference to Kronhofer, case C-168/02, ECLI:EU:C:2004:364.
66 Paras 42–57.
67 The private encryption key is the equivalent of a password, through which the investor gains access
to the tokens he or she has purchased.
68 A similar argument has been put forth with reference to cryptocurrencies in the USA by Max I
Raskin, ‘Real of the Coin: Bitcoin and Civil Procedure’ (2015) 20(4) Fordham Journal of Corporate
and Financial Law 969.
69 Case C-12/15, Universal Music International Holding BV v Michael Te´treault Schilling and Others,
ECLI:EU:C:2016:449, paras 36–39. See also the AG Opinion in the same case,
ECLI:EU:C:2016:161, paras 44–45.
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present. Thus, given that the physical location of a private encryption key may be
difficult to determine in practice and easy to manipulate, further criteria must be
found in order to determine whether Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation is
applicable to cases where the claimant purchased blockchain-based tokens on the
secondary market. The case law of the CJEU offers some further important indi-
cations in this respect.
The CJEU revisited the problem of jurisdiction in another prospectus liability
case, Lo¨ber,70 which provides some meaningful comparisons with ICO-related
litigation. Lo¨ber concerned a claim brought by a non-professional investor against
the issuer of a financial instrument. Importantly, the claimant and respondent
were located in two different EU Member States, and the question arose whether
the courts of the Member State where the claimant-investor was resident had
jurisdiction pursuant to Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation71 on the basis of
the characterization of the investor’s place of residence as the ‘place where the
harmful event occurred’. Having reiterated that specific heads of jurisdiction
should be construed narrowly,72 the Court clarified that ‘the mere fact that the
applicant has suffered financial consequences does not justify the attribution of
jurisdiction to the courts of the applicant’s domicile if both the events causing
damage and the damage itself occurred in the territory of another Member
State’.73 Against this background, the Court then proceeded to reconcile
Kolassa with Universal Music, stating that, while the location of a bank account
may in and of itself not be sufficient to establish jurisdiction in a claim for dam-
ages constituted by a purely financial loss,74 it may be possible to establish juris-
diction in cases where other specific factors of the case (other than the location of
the investor’s bank account) point towards the territory of the same Member
State.
In light of the above considerations, the CJEU concluded in Lo¨ber that the
courts of the Member State where the investor was domiciled (namely, Austria)
had jurisdiction because, besides the location of the investor’s bank account,
other factors connected the dispute to that Member State. More specifically,
the investor had made all payments from Austria and had dealings only with
Austrian banks, the instruments were purchased on the Austrian secondary
market, the information concerning the instruments had been notified to the
70 Helga Lo¨ber v Barclays Bank PLC, Case C-304/17, ECLI:EU:C:2018:701; see also AG Opinion,
ECLI:EU:C:2018:310, in particular paras 68–81, also with reference to Matteo Gargantini,
‘Capital markets and the market for judicial decisions: in search of consistency’ (2016) MPI
Luxembourg Working Paper Series 18; Matthias Lehmann, ‘Prospectus liability and private inter-
national law: assessing the landscape after the CJEU Kolassa ruling (Case C-375/13)’ (2016)
Journal of Private International Law 318; Andra Cotiga, A.,‘C.J.U.E., 28 janvier 2015, Harald
Kolassa c. Barclays Bank PLC, Aff. C-375-13’ (2015) Revue internationale des services financiers 40.
71 Corresponding to Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation.
72 Lo¨ber (n 70) para 23 with reference to Marinari, case C-364/93, ECLI EU:C:1995:289, para 14;
Kronhofer (n 65) para 19 and Universal Music (n 69) para 34.
73 Lo¨ber (n 70) para 24.
74 Ibid para 30.
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Austrian supervisory authority, and the investment contract was signed in
Austria.75
Transposing the judgment in Lo¨ber to the case of tokens, it appears that at least
some of the aforementioned factors may be relevant for the establishment of
jurisdiction. Although the issuance of tokens in the recent past has often taken
place without the publication of a prospectus and a formal notification to the
competent supervisory authority (which, in and of itself, may constitute a cause of
action), other elements may play an important role in ICO-related cases. In par-
ticular, the place of conclusion of the contract could provide an important con-
nection between this type of case and the territory of an EU Member State.
To further complicate the legal framework for the establishment of jurisdiction
in ICO-related cases, the ICO T&C often adds a further layer of complexity. In
this respect, the most obviously relevant type of agreement are exclusive jurisdic-
tion clauses; in the case of Tezos, for instance, the T&C specified that ‘(a)ny
dispute arising out of or in connection with the creation of the [tokens] and
the development and execution of the Tezos Network shall be exclusively and
finally settled by the ordinary courts of Zug, Switzerland’. As noted by the US
district judge denying the motion to dismiss, this is best understood not as a
‘click-wrap agreement’ but, rather, as a ‘browsestrap’ one; when subscribing,
investors were not asked to check a box indicating consent to the T&C but
simply enabled to retrieve the T&C on the website advertising the ICO.76 In
order to determine whether the forum selection clause is binding, hence, a
case-by-case assessment is necessary, evaluating whether—given the circum-
stances of this case, such as the structure of the website—it is reasonable to
expect the users to access the T&C and whether the claimant(s), in particular,
had any demonstrable knowledge of the contents of that document.
Should analogous ICO-related cases be brought before the courts of an EU
Member State, the same type of considerations would likely be relevant. More
specifically, the case law of the CJEU on click-wrap agreements77 may sometimes
not be applicable, depending on the structure of the token subscription process.
Furthermore, Article 19 of the Brussels I bis Regulation would generally prevent
the enforcement of such a clause whenever the subscribers would qualify as
consumers.
Additional doubt could be cast in regard to the enforceability of a forum se-
lection clause in cases where the claimant has purchased the tokens on the sec-
ondary market; in this setting, they would only bind the token holder under two
(demanding) conditions:
(i) that she/he succeeded in the rights and obligations of the primary market
purchaser she or he bought the tokens from, under the applicable national
law and
75 Ibid para 33.
76 See supra (n 57), section 2.i.
77 Jaouad El Majdoub v CarsOnTheWeb.Deutschland, case C-322/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:334.
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(ii) that she or he had the possibility to acquaint herself or himself with the
contents of the T&C.78
Finally, it is in any case doubtful to what extent a forum selection clause may
cover tortious claims (such as the ones based on an allegation of securities fraud).
In practice, the language and scope of the clause would play a crucial role in this
respect, possibly falling short of binding the token holders.79
The same observations would largely apply to cases where the T&C contain an
arbitration clause; consumer disputes (such as the ones involving retail investors)
may be deemed non-arbitrable, and further problems may in any case arise de-
pending on the attitude adopted by the seized court as to the incorporation by
reference of agreements to arbitrate80 and on the scope of the clause vis-a´-vis non-
contractual claims.
V. Conclusion
Blockchain technologies have a twofold impact on dispute resolution. On the one
hand, looking at potential future developments, these technologies seem to have
the ability to marginalize State courts by enabling the creation of self-enforcing
systems of private dispute resolution. These arbitral systems pose some significant
challenges and trigger the need for transnational law-making, concerning, in
particular, the balancing of conflicting needs in the enforcement phase. On the
other hand, however, such a marginalization of State courts has not yet taken
place. To the contrary, the recent phenomenon of ICOs has resulted in a wave of
court cases that create delicate jurisdictional issues. Especially in lawsuits where
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